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CORPORATIONS-DISSOLUTION-EFFECT ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECU· 
TION AcAINsr CORPORATION-Defendant corporation was prosecuted along 
with its• officers .and employees for submitting false statements on FHA 
insured foans1 and for conspiracy.2 After return of indictment the corpora-
tion was voluntarily dissolved under Texas law. The corporation's motion 
to dismiss the indictment on the ground that dissolution abated the prose-
cution was overruled. On appeal, held, affirmed. Article 1388 of the Texas 
civil statutes? which constitutes the president and directors trustees "to 
settle the affairs" of a dissolved corporation and to "maintain or defend 
judicial proceedings," continues the corporation in existence for the pur-
pose of defending federal criminal proceedings. Alamo Fence Company of 
Houston v. United States, (5th Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d) 179. 
1 18 u.s.c. (1952) §1010. 
2 18 u.s.c. (1952) §371. 
s Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1945) art. 1388. 
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At common law, dissolution of a corporation is analogized to death of 
a natural person, and all actions pending at time of dissolution or subse-
quently brought are abated.4 Today, however. almost every jurisdiction has 
a statute prolonging the life of a dissolved corporation for a stated period 
and for specific purposes. Generally the cause of action must have accrued 
prior to dissolution and must be of a type permitted by the prolongation 
statute of the state of incorporation, or the common law rule will apply.5 
Prolongation statutes in all but two states,6 however, do not specifically 
declare that criminal prosecutions are preserved beyond dissolution.7 Be-
cause of a dearth of state decisions interpreting these statutes, the federal 
courts have had to determine what the state legislatures intended. The re-
sult has been a discordant medley of decisions of which the present case is 
the latest.8 For example, two federal courts interpreted the Delaware pro-
longation statute as allowing survival of federal criminal prosecutions 
while two others ruled that they were abated.9 The courts allowing the 
prosecutions stated that the statute was remedial and should be broadly 
construed.10 These courts placed particular emphasis on the inclusion of the 
word "proceedings" in the statute,U feeling that it had great jurisdictional 
significance and should cover criminal prosecutions. Courts which refused 
to include such prosecutions under the Delaware statute narrowly in-
terpreted the words and concluded that only civil actions were intended to 
survive. 
Further insight into the motivation of courts in determining the inclu-
4 Marcus, "Suability of Dissolved Corporations-A Study in Interstate and Federal-
State Relationships," 58 HARv. L. REv. 675 (1945). 
5 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257 at 259 (1927). 
6 Criminal prosecutions are clearly not abated under Colorado and North Carolina 
statutes. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1955) §31-6-3; N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950; Supp. 
1955) §55-110. 
7 Although statutes vary in form, they may be grouped by jurisdictional words used: 
fifteen statutes say only "suits" do not abate; two use the word "actions"; four say "suit 
or actions"; five say "actions or proceedings"; two say "suit or proceedings"; eight say 
"actions, suits or proceedings"; six say "suit and liabilities"; one says "obligations and 
liabilities," and three are indefiuite. 
8 United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., (10th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 834, and Uuited 
States v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., (D.C. Colo. 1955) 132 F. Supp. 388, held that 
"suit" alone in the statute did not include a criminal prosecution. United States v. 
United States Vanadium Corp., (10th Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 646, held the same way with 
reservation but stated that "actions and proceedings" would include a federal criminal 
prosecution. The Union Carbide case also holds that statutes listing "liabilities and 
obligations" will not include criminal prosecutions. Contra, United States v. Cigarette 
Merchandisers Assn., (S.D. N.Y. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 214. For interpretation of "actions, 
suits or proceedings," see note 9 infra. 
o United States v. P. F. Collier and Son Corp., (7th Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 936; United 
States v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage .Assn., (D.C. Md. 1956) 138 F. Supp. 685, 
held that prosecutions are included. Contra: United States v. Line Material Co., (6th 
Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 929, and United States v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., note 
8 supra. 
10 United States v. Maryland State Licensed Beverage Assn., note 9 supra, at 708. 
11 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §278, reads "Action, Suit, or •Proceeding." 
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siveness of prolongation statutes lies in various public policy considerations. 
On the side-of the present case is fear that abatement of prosecutions will 
encourage formation of "shady" corporations and will allow morally repre-
hensible -eorporate officers partial absolution from the intended effect of 
statutory penalties,12 and that therefore, the community at large wiU suf-
fer.13 The present decision indicates that there is a stronger case for sur-
vival of liability when the prosecution is pending at dissolution than when 
it is brought after dissolution, but during the prolongation period. The 
time at which the prosecution is commenced, however, has little relevance 
to the validity of the claim or the damage to society. On the other hand, 
the wording of several state statutes indicates that the distinction might 
have some effect, since the jurisdictional words concerning pending ad-
judications are more inclusive.14 If, as in Texas,15 in addition to the pro-
longation statute there is a statute specifically preventing the abatement 
of the state•s criminal prosecutions, the argument for allowing a federal 
prosecution is strengthened on the basis that the state cannot discriminate 
against the federal government by keeping the corporation alive for its 
own prosecutions but denying it life for federal purposes.16 
If a corporation is prosecuted in the courts of a state in which it has 
done business but is incorporated in another, there is authority applying 
the prolongation statute of the prosecuting state.17 Also, since a corporation 
must gain the consent of the incorporating state to dissolve, it may be pos-
sible to enjoin the state from granting dissolution until the criminal prose-
cution is completed. By such procedure many of the jurisdictional prob-
lems described above may be avoided.18 Absent state legislative action or 
judicial interpretation, however, the effect of state prolongation statutes on 
federal prosecutions against corporations engaged in intrastate business 
will necessarily continue to lack uniformity.19 
Lawrence ]. LaBrie 
12 Corporate officers remain personally liable despite dissolution of the corporation. 
See notes I and 2 supra. However, ownership and operation of many small companies are 
in the same persons. Thus, a fine on the corporation may be a fine on its policymakers. 
The recent increase of the penalty on corporations for violation of the antitrust laws 
from $5,000 to $50,000 is further inducement to try to escape by dissolution. 69 Stat. 
282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §1. 
13 United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 145 F. 
Supp. 374 at 375; United States v. Western Pennsylvania Sand and Gravel Assn., (W .D. 
Pa. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 158 at 160. 
14 Principal case at 182. Contra, United States v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 
note 8 supra. See Ohio Rev. Code (Page, Supp. 1956) §1701.88. 
15 Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1945) art. 1374. 
16 See Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Building Corp., 
302 U.S. 120 (1937), dissent of Justice Cardozo at 131. 
17 Dr. Hess and Clark, Inc. v. Metalsalts Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1954) 119 F. Supp. 427. 
18 United States v. Western Pennsylvania Sand and Gravel Assn., note 13 supra. 
19 But see United States v. United States Vanadium Corp., note 8 supra, at 649, and 
United States v. Leche, (E.D. La. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 765, indicating that the Supreme 
Court or Congress might act to insure uniformity of interpretation of state prolongation 
statutes in federal prosecutions. 
